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Abstract 
Operational risks have become more prominent than ever before, but recent events such as hacker attacks on the 
French and Dutch banking systems, or disruptions in the aftermath of natural disasters such as Sandy have 
highlighted the need for better IT risk management. Typically only few historical data on such events is available 
within organizations if at all. Therefore, new approaches need to be developed for Operational Risk 
Management (ORM) that are rooted in the organization and based on work flows and aims.  
To ensure compliance with and use of the risk management approaches, an integration of ORM in day-to-day 
operative business processes is essential. Therefore, this paper focuses on a model assessing the impact of 
operational risks on business processes and activities. It develops a Petri-net model to derive valid data to 
describe the severity of an identified operational risk although there is no of absent comprehensive statistical 
data-base. To relate the work to the organizational aims at each hierarchical level, the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) is used to provide a structured means for evaluation of risk.  
An example from the finance sector illustrates the theoretical model that was developed together with users and 
developers from SAP research.  
Keywords: Operational Risk Management; IT Risks: Business Process Model; Petri-Net based risk assessment; 
decision support 
1.  Introduction 
Today’s business environments are characterized by increasing complexity and uncertainty. Therefore, 
sustainable economic growth of societies and companies requires that risks are assessed and analysed proactively 
to find an appropriate balance between potential threats, mitigation measures and opportunities to ensure and 
sustain success and growth. Particularly, with the growth of modern ICT systems and the rise of virtual 
organizations, smart technologies, and increasing automatisation, organizations have become more vulnerable to 
IT disruptions than ever before.  
1.1 Operational Risks: A Definition 
Despite its prominence in the current debate, there is no unanimous definition of the term risk. Rather, the 
understanding of how risk should be understood largely depends on the context and the domain of application. 
All definitions have in common that risk relates to uncertain outcomes or consequences of an event, a decision or 
a policy. In finance and banking, these outcomes comprise chances and losses, whereas in crisis and emergency 
management, enterprise or supply chain risk management, there are no positive aspects of risk. Following the 
latter rationale, here, risk is understood in a purely negative way. Along with the debate about adequate 
definitions of risk and risk management (French, Maule, & Papamichail, 2009; Haimes, 2009), also diverse 
typologies and classifications of risk did arise. One of the most prominent characterisations is the distinction 
between financial and operational risk (Beroggi & Wallace, 1994; Rippel & Teply, 2011).  
Generally, operational risks represent risks within an organization or system that can lead to losses (Moscadelli, 
2004). Operational risks are recognized to be a major source of large organizational losses (Chavez-Demoulin, 
Embrechts, & Neslehova, 2006). Therefore, a considerable amount of compulsory provisions have been 
established such as Basel II, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or Solvency II. 
Although their importance is widely recognised, approaches to measure and integrate operational risks into the 
organizational government are rare. Most often, operational risk are captured under the umbrella term of 
“residual risk” (Power, 2005). As a consequence, there is a need for transparent approaches to support decision 
makers facing operational risk.  
In part, the lack of recognition is owed to the specific characteristics of operational risks: first, their 
consequences are purely negative, as opposed to the majority of strategic, credit and market risks. Therefore, 
management and even strategic decisions are prone to cognitive biases and several forms of heuristic thinking 
such as the confirmation thinking or the availability bias (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). At the same time, 
operational risks are hard to quantify since only few historical data about impact and likelihood of operational 
risks are available (Alexander, 2000; Chavez-Demoulin et al., 2006; Power, 2005). This leads to the difficulty of 
implementing statistics-based top-down methods that assess risk capital by analysing the historical volatility of 
key controlling figures that strongly correlate with exposure to risk (Cornalba & Giudici, 2004). Therefore, an 
approach is needed that enables de-biasing on the basis of actual performance aims and qualitative information 
on the priority or criticality of these aims. Second, approaches to identify and assess risks despite the lack of 
information need to be developed. This paper presents an approach that makes headway in both respects.   
1.2 Managing Operational Risk  
Since operational risks are generally associated with negative consequences for the organization, they need to be 
minimized through a detailed examination of their sources and careful analysis of their impacts. The application 
of a phase model is a widespread approach to risk management. While there are different terms that are used in 
literature, and in different domains the phases and steps are presented on various levels of granularities, the most 
frequently used phases are risk identification, risk assessment and analysis, risk management (and possibly 
mitigation), and monitoring and control of risk (French & Geldermann, 2005; Renn, 2008). Figure 1 illustrates 
this risk management cycle. Most importantly, risk management should not be understood as a linear process, 
but that should be an essential, continuously performed and updated management process. Figure 1 illustrates the 
need for continuously identifying (emerging) risks, assessing and analyzing risks according to changes in risk 
perception and strategic goals of the organization and implementing adequate risk management strategies. 
Therefore risk management approaches need to be included / must be adapted to processes and information 
systems that are used in day-to-day operations. 
 
Figure 1. The risk management cycle for a process-oriented understanding of ORM. 
This paper focuses on the first two phases: risk identification and assessment and analysis. It presents an 
approach for assessing operational risks, which is based on an intelligent tool that exploits the information 
systems and data available within an organization. To take into account the fact that operational risk events are 
often related to rare events, and information is scarce or completely lacking, this paper proposes an approach 
centred on an intelligent tool that makes use of machine learning to identify and assess risk. To achieve this goal, 
I will focus on Operational Risk Analysis, which is the starting point for risk management and mitigation. 
To acknowledge and reflect the role and importance of IT applications and information systems, this paper will 
focus on IT applications and impact of their disruption. Most approaches to capture and quantify IT-related risk 
stem from the security domain, and aim at modelling the global economic or physical consequences of a 
disruption (Anderson & Moore, 2006; Jackson, Jickling, & Webel, 2004), emphasising the trigger event instead 
of mitigating the potential consequences. Other approaches have been developed in the domain of critical 
infrastructure protection (Giannopulos, Filippini, & Schimmer, 2012; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). Yet, 
these typically focus on the overall economic consequences at societal level. To my best knowledge, there are 
today no other approaches to support management of operational IT risks at an organisational level.  
2 Business Process-Based Operational IT Risk Analysis 
Every organization exists to achieve its goals. On the top level, organizations usually have a strategic mission 
that is implemented in terms of business objectives and strategies on how to reach these objectives. Strategies are 
broken-down into various organizational levels and are supported by business processes. A business process-
oriented organization regards each product or service that it provides as a result of a number of performed 
activities. In this respect, business processes are key to organizing activities and improving the understanding of 
their relations to ultimately increase performance (van der Aalst, ter Hofstede, & Weske, 2003).  
 
Figure 2.  Impact of operational risks on Business processes and performance  
Figure 2 shows that if a business process is at risk, the strategic aims related to the activity are at risk as well, 
resulting in failure to achieve the strategic objectives. More and more organizations have recognized efficiency 
gains through decentralized and cross-departmental processes. Therefore, they have organized their 
organization-wide and inter-organizational activities along horizontal business processes. As a result, ORM 
activities need to be centred on business processes. Prioritisation and risk assessments need to reflect the 
criticality and relevance: in how far they enable an enterprise to achieve strategic goals. 
A trigger event impacts IT applications, services and infrastructures to the extent to which they are vulnerable to 
this specific event or attack (cf. Figure 2). Therefore, technology driven IT risk management should focus on the 
vulnerability (i.e., the susceptibility to the damaging effects of a triggering event (Aven, 2007)). Vulnerabilities 
can be reduced in two ways: reducing vulnerabilities of technical components; e.g., by introducing better 
firewalls; or by improving the resilience of the networked system of IT applications, e.g., by installing backup 
systems. In this paper, I focus on the resilience aspects of IT risk management, which include the context and 
business environment to consider the importance of IT applications in terms of achieving (or not) strategic aims, 
to better prioritise scarce risk management resources. In particular, this means that operational risks that might 
adversely affect critical business processes need to be identified prior to subsequently anticipating their (direct 
or indirect) consequences. This allows decision makers to see prior strongly a business process is affected and 
what consequences this would have for the organization, in order to take the right measures at an early stage. To 
efficiently analyze risks, this paper follows an approach that aims at unveiling cause-effect relationships between 
threats and business processes through a formalization of the relations between different layers of processes.  
A first, naïve approach to modelling IT risks has been developed by Sackmann (2008) understanding the relation 
as binary variables, which means in this context that elements modeling relations between applications can only 
take two values which are “1” and “0”, where “1” signifies that there is a relationship between element i and 
element j, whilst “0” means no such relationship exists. This approach does not present any details on how to 
translate threats on IT applications into quantitative measures such as monetary losses or products not delivered. 
Moreover, the propagation of impact through layered networks of business processes and IT-applications cannot 
be monitored or modeled. 
Therefore, other approaches taking into account the actual criticality of a process in terms of mostly monetary 
implications have been developed, as well as Petri-net based models capturing business flows and dependencies. 
Fenz, Ekelhart, & Neubauer (2009) have addressed this problem by developing a framework for the evaluation 
of organizational resources used within a business process based on its flow activities. The motivation behind 
this work is the need to determine realistic impact values based on the importance of the resources affected by 
identified risks. Business processes are modeled with Petri nets which allow for a detailed consideration of 
several routings of activities with the help of different building blocks such as AND-splits, AND-joins, OR-splits 
and OR-joins (van der Aalst, 1999). This model strongly concentrates on determining of resource importance 
values based on business processes and their detailed flow of activities. However, it does not provide any details 
how this activity-based information can be used to determine loss values based on the value of the business 
process affected by a risk. As Sackmann (2008) has shown, the failure of resources, IT applications in particular, 
have a negative effect on business processes. Therefore, what is further needed to appropriately determine a 
monetary loss is an adequate determination of the importance or criticality of the business process affected by an 
operational risk in an organizational context. Criticalities of business processes in this work, however, are only 
rough estimates, raising the need for enhanced determinations of business processes’ criticalities. 
Instead of focusing on business processes as a means to reach organizational objectives, we propose to use 
business functions as core activities of a business. Following different definitions from the domain of Critical 
Infrastructures (Comes, Bertsch, & French, 2013; Ulieru, 2007); supply chain risk management (Craighead, 
Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007; Egan, 2007); and the resilience discussion (Birkmann, 2006; 
ICSU/IRDR, 2013), we define core business functions as a a group of activities that must be sustained and 
maintained in order to ensure the enterprise to function; a failure of these activities has sever consequences and 
hampers the achievement of the firms overall goals, or violates fundamental values.   
An importance value is then defined in terms of how ‘central’ or ‘core’ a business function. The importance or 
criticality of an IT application is then modeled the product of its relative necessity for a certain business function 
(e.g. employee administration) and the relative importance of the business function for organizational objectives. 
Here we propose to determine both factors with the help of the multi-criteria decision support method Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1994).  
3   A Quantitative Approach for Operational IT Risk Assessment 
The approach presented here determines the expected loss for the organization if an IT application fails by taking 
into account the importance of an IT application derived from the importance of different business function 
across departments. To this end, first the criticality of individual processes is determined using AHP. In a second 
step, the overall criticality of a disruption is determined by using a Petri-Net model.  
3.1 Business Process Criticality Analysis with AHP 
For the overall purpose of determining the financial impact resulting from operational risks, existing business 
processes in the organization affected by those risks, should be analyzed in terms of their criticality or value for 
the organization. From a strategic management perspective, every organization has a mission, which generally 
describes the overall purpose of the organization and stands on the first level in the hierarchy. On the second 
level, organizational objectives are formulated that support the achievement of the organization’s mission. In 
order to realize these organizational objectives, business processes consisting of a distinct flow of enclosed 
activities are needed, thus reflecting the third level in such a functional hierarchy (Suh & Han, 2003). As various 
business processes are supporting different organizational objectives with varying degrees and organizational 
objectives, in turn, have differing contributions to the organization’s mission, business processes have different 
importance values.  
Given this assumption, as well as the hierarchical structure described above, I apply the AHP developed by 
Thomas Saaty in the 1970s to decompose a problem into a hierarchy consisting of an overall goal, criteria, 
potential sub-criteria and alternatives on the lowest level (Saaty, 1977). AHP is an expert-based method that asks 
experts from different departments or domains to perform pairwise comparisons between objectives or criteria. 
From there, weights, are calculated which represent relative importance values by assessing the eigenvalues of 
the comparison matrices. AHP works ‘bottom-up’ by starting at the lowest level in the hierarchy and 
successively working its way up to the top level. For this comparison a predefined scale is required, which 
should be used consistently throughout all levels in the hierarchy.  
3.2  Activity Analysis with Petri Nets 
From the different criticalities, I proceed next to modeling the propagation of failure through a network of 
activities and processes. Not every activity is executed with the same probability since activities are not always 
executed sequentially, but also in parallel or in a conditional mode, which has an influence on the severity to 
which a business process is exposed to risks when the activity is disturbed due to a failure of an IT application. 
Therefore, it is necessary to define what the relationship between the business process and its activities looks like 
in detail. To address this issue the flow of execution of available activities provides the information on how 
important certain activities are for the successful execution of a business process, which in turn, contributes to 
the aim of accurately determining the financial impact if an operational risk occurs. For example, if an activity 
cannot be performed since the IT application necessary for this activity fails, and this activity is executed with a 
probability of 0.25 in the corresponding business process, this leads to a smaller impact compared to a scenario 
where an activity fails that is executed with a probability of 1 in a certain business process. 
In order to analyze and represent the flow of activities within a business process, several business process 
modeling techniques can be applied such as Event-driven Process Chains (EPC), Business Process Model and 
Notation (BPMN) or Petri nets. If a formal mathematical model of the business process is required for the means 
of obtaining a detailed analysis of its execution semantics, Petri nets have proven to be a useful method (Fenz et 
al. 2009; Van der Aalst 1998). Further models to capture more complex structures include Bayesian Networks or 
Neural Networks (Smith & Gupta, 2000). To capture ambiguity and imprecision, also Fuzzy Cognitive Maps and 
Causal Maps have been used (Montibeller & Franco, 2011).  In this first approach Petri nets have been applied 
for they provide a simple means to model also non linear relations between different activities and capture flows. 
When looking at typical execution semantics of activities within certain business processes, there are four main 
routings constructs: sequential, parallel, conditional and iterative. Sequential routing reflects causal relationships 
between the precedent and the subsequent activity, which means that an activity can only be executed after the 
successful completion of the previous activity. Hence, there is a strict order of execution. Parallel routing implies 
a less strict execution order and allows for arbitrary executions in parallel. Two building blocks are needed to 
model this type of routing, which are AND-splits and AND-joins. In contrast to parallel routing, conditional 
routing models a choice between two or more alternative paths with- in the process. Conditional routing is 
realized with the building blocks OR-split and OR-join. 
Due to these different routings, activities are passed through in a business process with different probabilities, 
which influence the degree to which a business process is exposed to risks. Therefore, these probabilities need to 
be incorporated in the calculation framework to deter- mine an appropriate loss number per business process and 
per operational risk. The formal framework for calculating an activity importance factor reflecting the 
probabilities that a business process will pass through certain activities, given the assumption of equally 
distributed OR-splits, as introduced by Fenz et al. (2009), will be applied in this model.  
The importance of an activity Ai can be defined as the sum of the importance values I(PjAi) of its incoming edges 
EAi divided by the amount ingoing edges |EAi|: 𝐼 𝐴! = 𝐼 𝑃!𝐴!!!"!!! 𝐸!" . The importance of a place is the 
sum of the importance of its incoming edges and is set to “1” if the amount of ingoing edges is empty which 
represents the first state in the process. Edges need to be distinguished in the following way: edges which link an 
activity and a place present a potential AND-split since the result of the split might be the generation of several 
places with a continuing flow in parallel. For AND-splits, the importance of the edge equals the importance of its 
source activity: 𝐼 𝑃!𝐴! = 𝐼 𝐴! , whereas for OR-splits, the importance of the edge is determined by the 
importance of the source place divided by the amount of outgoing edges 𝐼 𝑃!𝐴! = 𝐼 𝑃! 𝐸!" .  
The relationships between the of the dependency model can be formally described with the help of three 
matrices representing the different layers as shown in Figure 2: 
BP	  ×	  A:	  	   relationships between business processes and activities, represented by the probabilities of activities 
of being passed through within a business process. These probabilities are obtained with the help of the Petri net-
based activity analysis of this model. 
A	  ×	  ITA:	  	   relationships between activities and IT applications reflecting the degree to which activities are 
dependent on certain IT applications. While some activities cannot be realized without an IT application, others 
can still run, but may be disturbed if the IT application fails. To formally express this, a disturbance factor P is 
introduced. Decision makers who know the degree of the dependency in detail can insert explicit values in place 
of the disturbance factor. A larger P means a higher dependency and thus a higher disturbance, with P = 1 as a 
full failure of performance of the activity. 
ITA	  ×	  R:	   relationships between IT applications and operational risks showing which IT applications are 
affected by which operational risks. These relationships are modeled as binaries, where “1” means that an 
operational risk affects a certain IT application and “0” means it does not affect this or several IT applications. If 
a risk occurs and there is a path in the dependency model from this risk to an IT application, this would leads to a 
failure of the IT application. 
To unveil the cause-effect chains between operational risks and business processes, the three matrices described 
above have to be multiplied through all layers leading to the matrix:  
BP×R= (BP×A)*(A×ITA)*(ITA×R). 
By modeling cause-effect relationships between business processes, activities, IT applications and operational 
risks, it can be revealed which business processes are affected by which operational risks. In the next section, I 
illustrate this approach by an example application from the finance sector. 
 Figure 3.  Hierarchy of Aims and Objectives for the Financial Service Provider 
4 Example Application: A Financial Service Provider 
The following use case applies the approach presented above in exemplary business processes of a financial 
service provider. The data has been elicited in interviews with clients of SAP research in fall 2011. Those 
customers were related to finance and insurance industries and had shown interest in applications of business 
process modeling. However, they were not familiar with AHP processes, requiring a short introduction at the 
beginning of each interview. In total, four interviews and twelve phone interviews were performed to elicit the 
data. The values underlying the calculations are averages of the weights elicited in the interviews.   
4.1 Business Process Criticality Analysis 
The business processes are compared with respect to their contribution to objectives in order to define the 
criticality CBpk. The hierarchy, which defines the criticality of a business process, starts with the overall mission, 
followed by organizational business objectives, and business processes on the third level. In this use case, the 
financial provider’s hierarchical objectives are summarized in Figure 3. 
The degree of contribution or importance of each business process to the objectives varies according to the 
workflow and to what the process actually delivers for the organization. Likewise, organizational objectives are 
contributing to the organization’s mission with varying degrees. These hierarchical interactions result in different 
criticalities per business process. As shown in Section 3.1, the criticality of a business process can be determined 
with AHP by calculating relative weights that represent the relative importance values serving as the criticality 
of a business process in relation to different organizational objectives and in relation to the mission respectively. 
The six business processes have been pairwise compared regarding their importance for one business objective 
each. This has been done with estimations and common sense by the author. However, a business process owner 
or a manager responsible for these processes would be able to provide more reasonable estimations. Table 1 
shows the relative importance values of the business processes regarding the three objectives: 
 
Importance for Contribution 
to Mission 
0.08 0.33 0.59 
 
Importance of… 
… to increase 
customer satisfaction 
… to increase number 
of clients 
… to improve 
service quality 
Core Sales  0.27 0.05 0.04 
Marketing Campaign 0.43 0.07 0.06 
Call Centre 0.07 0.25 0.27 
Customer Complaint 0.09 0.35 0.36 
Cash Withdrawal 0.07 0.14 0.13 
Cash Deposit 0.07 0.14 0.13 
Table 1. Relative importance factors of the six business processes regarding the objectives,  
  and objectives’ contribution to overall mission (first line) 
Overall, the two most important business processes in this use case are the Customer Complaint Process 
followed by the Call Center Process with the highest importance values (0,36 and 0,27) for the most decisive 
organizational objective, Increase Customer Satisfaction with an importance value of 0,59. Only the most 
critical business process will be used to demonstrate the model for quantitative risk analysis. 
4.2 Activity Analysis 
The Customers Complaint Process consists of 12 activities. It starts with the registration of a complaint, then 
classifies the complaint in terms of whether this complaint is a simple or a complex case, if it is a complex case 
it checks further data and policies from internal databases, decides whether this complaint can be accepted or 
needs to be rejected and pays the damage or sends rejection notice accordingly. Since the complaint is either a 
complex case or a simple case, this presents a conditional routing as well as either the acceptance or the rejection 
of a complex complaint. Therefore, the activity flow modeled with Petri nets shows two equally distributed 
exclusive OR-splits and OR-joins. 
Moreover, the activities of the Customers Complaint Process depend on several different IT applications. These 
IT applications are the Registration Service (ITA1), the CRM System (ITA2), the Classification Service (ITA3), 
the Core Banking System (ITA4), Accounting System (ITA5) and the Notification Service (ITA6). The degrees of 
dependency of an activity on an IT application, also referred to as disturbance factors, are specified with explicit 
numbers by the author. Again, as with the comparisons of business processes with AHP, IT experts or 
administrators of the IT applications within the organization are able to provide a lot more reasonable numbers 
within the specific organizational context. The Petri net-based modeling of the business process Customers 
Complaint Process with the probabilities, required IT applications and the degree of the activities’ dependencies 
on the IT applications is depicted in Figure 4. A similar process has been performed for BP2, the Call Centre 
Process. The importance of the states, edges and transitions of the Petri net have been calculated depending on 
the workflow semantic of the process. The importance of transitions (activities) reflects the probability that these 
activities will be passed through in the business process. 
 Figure 5.  Customers Complaints Process with probabilities and required IT applications 
4.3 Operational Risk Management 
In total, there are eighteen different activities, each with certain probabilities of being processed within the 
business processes BP1 (Customers Complaints Process) and BP2 (Call Centre Process) and requiring various IT 
applications for their realization and successful execution of the process. In this step, it is first crucial to identify 
operational risks which might have a negative impact on these IT applications. The operational risks as identified 
in the context of this use case have been elicited by a thorough literature study, including business reports, risk 
analyses and media reports on risks in the financial sector.  
1. Operating error in CRM system (R1) 
2. Virus in VoIP system (R2) 
3. Hacking attack on the accounting system (R3) 
4. Internal network crash (R4) 
5. Destruction of the core computation centre (R5)  
6. Electricity failure in the computation centre (R6) 
7. Crash of the help desk system (R7) 
While the matrices BP x A and A x ITA can be derived immediately from the Petri Net (shown in Figure 5 for 
BP1), 𝐼𝑇𝐴  𝑥  𝑅   is defined as in Table 2 below: 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 
ITA1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ITA2 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ITA3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ITA4 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ITA5 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
ITA6 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ITA7 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
ITA8 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ITA9 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Table 2.  Matrix ITA x R for the Use Case 
Finally, the matrix BP	  ×	  R	  (Table	  3)	  shows which business processes are affected to which degrees by the 
operational risks identified prior. In essence, BP1 has a much higher accumulated risk value (19.9 as opposed to 
13.7 for BP2), due to its greater importance for overall aims, but also since a failure the processes it involves 
(including activities and IT applications) have much more severe consequences across the organization.  
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 
BP1 2.35 0 0.75 5.6 5.6 5.6 0 
BP2 0.25 1.5 0 3.9 3.9 3.9 0.25 
Table 3. Matrix BP x R providing an overview of operational risk level 
The analysis of the risks shows, that risks 4 to 6 (network crash, and failures of the computation centre) do have 
the severest implications across business processes (5.6 for BP1 and 3.9 for BP2). Taking a decision-oriented 
stance this means that risk management measures should focus on these risks, either reducing the likelihood of 
there occurrence, or their impact on the business processes. A risk such as a virus in the VoIP system does have 
severe implication for the call centre (1.5), yet does not affect other processes, and can therefore be considered 
within the given department, rather than on an overall strategic level. 
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper has presented a quantitative method to identify and assess operational IT risk based on the business 
processes affected, their internal control of activities and the activities’ dependency on IT applications. I have 
taken a decision-oriented stance measuring risk on the basis of impact on core aims of the enterprise, rather than 
referring to secondary metrics, such as KPIs or monetary values. To model the propagation of risks in highly 
interlaced networks of processes and applications, I propose applying a Petri net approach for modeling the 
execution flow of activities within a business process. In this manner, the probabilities of activities to be relevant 
for the successful operation of a business process can be represented while considering different possibilities of 
execution flows in terms of the sequential, parallel and conditional mode. This method uses matrix-based 
formalization and calculations for the specification of interrelations between business processes, activities, IT 
applications, and operational risks. To capture the importance of IT applications, we have not referred to a 
simplified binary model, but used Petri nets and used a dependency factor between activities and applications. 
Hence, if an activity is disturbed to a certain degree based on its dependency on the IT application affected by 
this risk, and this activity is executed with a probability of e.g. 0.25 (due to several conditional splits in the 
activity flow), this results in a smaller adverse effect on the business process than the disturbance or failure of an 
activity executed with a probability of 1 (as in the standard paradigm). This leads to more detailed insights into 
the cause-effect relationships between business processes and risks. Future work consists in the further 
investigation of dependency factors, including their dynamic evolution over time to capture the recovery process. 
For determining the criticality of different business processes, this framework integrates the multi-criteria 
decision support method AHP providing a structured way to estimate the importance or criticality of business 
processes. Here, more stakeholder interviews to achieve a more comprehensive picture of aims and requirements 
can be conducted. With regard to risk, future work consists in the assessment of the financial loss per business 
process over time, which can subsequently be modeled as a product of its criticality, its recovery time, the daily 
income of the organization and the severity factor from the dependency model. A total loss related to the risk can 
then be obtained by adding up the losses per business processes affected by the risk, to complement the analysis 
on the basis of strategic objectives. 
To conclude, this paper has provided an approach towards the support of decision makers in the area of 
Operational Risk Management (ORM) by aligning risk analysis with organizational business processes and by 
performing a detailed analysis of their activities as well as the activities’ dependencies on IT applications.  
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